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One of the outcomes of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 was to strengthen the desire to 
promote greater economic and monetary cooperation in the region. One of the initiatives 
is the proposal to establish the Asian Currency Unit (ACU). This will allow economic 
agents in the region to invoice financial and trade transactions in a common currency and 
reduce exchange rate risks as well as channel Asia’s savings more efficiently within the 
region. 
 
This paper analyzes the viability of an Asian Currency Unit, identifying the political and 
economic constraints in it’s development. It argues for an expansion of the initiative from 
its current scope to include major players in the region like India. The paper spells out a 
number of strategies that could be undertaken to remove the existing constraints and 
promote the use of the regional currency. It is hoped that the issues raised in the paper 
will provide useful inputs for policymakers across the region and deepen the discussion 
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 Abstract
In this paper we evaluate the feasibility of a common Asian Currency Unit
(ACU) involving countries of East and South Asia. We analyze the various
properties of an ACU and calculate it’s value using weighted averages of the
values of Asian currencies. Looking at the movement of individual Asian cur-
rencies vis-´ a-vis the ACU, we ﬁnd that there have been severe misalignments
among the Asian currencies during the past seven years. We discuss the possibil-
ity of the Rupee ﬁguring in the ACU and identify the major economic, political
and historical impediments in the way of faster acceptance of ACU in the region.
We point out the various strategies that could be employed to facilitate faster
adoption of ACU. These include creating certain institutional safeguards as well
as strengthening the existing ones. Finally, we highlight some ways to promote
the use and acceptability of the ACU and also emphasize the importance of
conceiving a larger framework of participating countries, including India.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F36; F41;
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ivFeasibility of an Asian Currency Unit∗
1 Introduction
At the 39th Annual Meeting of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in Hyderabad in
May 2006, ministers from China, Japan and Korea announced that they would make
concerted eﬀort at coordinating their currencies with the objective of evolving towards
the creation of a regional currency i.e. the Asian Currency Unit (ACU). It was also
pointed out that as a result of the ever increasing linkages in trade, investment and
ﬁnancial ﬂows among Asian countries, it is important to have stable intra-regional
exchange rates while allowing suﬃcient ﬂexibility against external currencies like the
US dollar, Sterling and the Euro.
At the meeting it was also decided that the ﬁrst step towards this objective will
be the creation of an ACU, which is an appropriately weighted index of Asian curren-
cies, and designed to monitor the collective movement of the participating currencies
against the key external currencies as well as the individual currencies’ movements
relative to the ACU. This would enable the participating countries to stabilize their
exchange rates against the ACU basket if at some later date they wanted to enter into
an Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) like arrangement. As pointed out by Kuroda
and Kawai (2002), the ACU is likely to act as a statistical indicator summarizing the
collective movement of Asian currencies. It will also work as a market-based currency
basket and serve as an oﬃcial unit of account for monetary and exchange rate policy
coordination.
As a regional benchmark, the ACU will help understand the degree of divergence
of each participating countries’ currencies, which can improve the understanding of
the generic problems in a particular currency’s market and in pursuing appropriate
macroeconomic policies. The ACU can also be used to devise new instruments that
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1can be easily traded across the border without the underlying exchange rate risk. Im-
porters and exporters can denominate intra-Asia trade in ACU. Asian governments
or corporates may wish to issue sovereign or corporate bonds in ACU. Various cen-
tral banks can hold part of their reserves in ACU and even commercial banks could
take deposits and give loans denominated in ACU. The widespread use of ACU will
deﬁnitely increase the extent of ﬁnancial and trade integration in this part of the
world.
However, the success of this initiative requires an immense degree of political will.
The promotion of the ACU will have to be backed by creation of new institutions and
strengthening the existing ones to facilitate greater cooperation among the participat-
ing countries. Moreover, new strategies have to be developed to ensure greater use of
the ACU among participating countries.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a select review
of the literature on optimum currency area and monetary cooperation. In Section
3, we focus on the European experience of a move towards a common currency and
the lessons for Asian economies. Section 4 argues a case for the inclusion of the
Indian Rupee in the ACU. In Section 5 we analyze the composition of the ACU
involving diﬀerent sets of participating countries and also highlight the deviation of
the participating currencies from the regional benchmark. Finally, Section 6 outlines
the various economic, political and historical obstacles that need to be overcome to
ensure a successful move towards a common currency unit. We also discuss the various
strategies and institutions that need to be set in place for a successful transition
towards an ACU.
2 Selected Review of the Literature
Seminal contributions by Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963) gave rise to the theory
of optimum currency area (OCA) as well as monetary and exchange rate cooperation
among countries. Mundell (1961) points out that countries that are symmetrically
aﬀected by shocks are the prime candidates for an OCA. On the other hand OCA can
comprise of countries that are impacted by asymmetrical shocks, provided that labor
and capital are suﬃciently mobile and prices are ﬂexible enough so that persistent
pockets of unemployment do not exist. Other relatively less important criteria include
similarity of preferences over output-inﬂation trade-oﬀ and provision of supporting
policies such as ﬁscal transfers.
The most conspicuous beneﬁt of an OCA is the reduction in transaction costs in-
volved with international trade in goods, services, labour and capital. Moreover, in
OCA there is a decrease in the uncertainty associated with exchange rate, which is
2likely to foster trade and investment ﬂows. Entering an OCA also imposes a “disci-
pline” on individual countries as it frees the central banks from the urge to embark
on inﬂationary policies.
Speculation on changes in bilateral exchange rates leads to instability in foreign
exchange markets, which in turn has negative eﬀects on countries’ internal and external
balances. Such speculative attacks are greatly reduced from entering into an OCA.
Countries are also deterred from pursuing uncoordinated economic policies like ‘beggar
thy neighbour’, which has a negative impact on all the countries.
Costs associated with establishment of an OCA include the loss of autonomy in
the conduct of monetary policy. In economies characterized by nominal rigidities and
imperfectly integrated factor markets, monetary policy is an extremely important tool
for stabilizing the economy. A change in the nominal exchange rate leads to a change
in the real exchange rate and has an eﬀect on the overall trade balance. The exchange
rate also acts as an automatic stabilizer and helps the country maintain internal and
external balance in the face of changes in aggregate demand.
Frankel and Rose (1998) mooted the idea that some of the OCA criteria discussed
above can be endogenous. Once a group of countries establish a currency area by
permanently ﬁxing their exchange rates, the degree of intra-area economic integration
will increase along with the degree of symmetry of economic shock. Thus deeper
economic integration and symmetry of shocks are not the prerequisites of establishing
a common currency area or other degrees of monetary cooperation. Instead, if these
countries exhibit a strong political commitment to coordinate monetary and exchange
rate policies, then their attempt to form a currency area can be successful as long as
they satisfy the OCA criteria to some extent initially.
Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999) analyze the economic and political prospects for
monetary integration in East Asia, and based on the high level of trade and FDI
integration, speed of adjustment to shock and symmetric supply and demand distur-
bances, conclude that the region satisﬁes the standard OCA criteria for the adoption
of a common monetary policy. However a major deterrent to this process is the is-
sue of sacriﬁcing monetary autonomy especially given the weak ﬁnancial system in a
number of these countries.
Looking at the evolving trade patterns in Asia, Kawai and Motonishi (2005) ﬁnd
that in the last decade there has been a rapid expansion of intra-regional trade as well
as vertical intra-industry trade in manufactured products. Moreover, intra-regional
trade as a share of total trade in East Asia has risen from 35% in 1980 to 54% in
2003. In terms of FDI integration, Japan, United States and EU are equally important
3foreign direct investors in East Asia, with Japan being the most signiﬁcant in ASEAN.
Degree of labour market integration varies across the countries of the region. De-
veloped economies of Japan and Korea have maintained tight restrictions on labour
mobility. On the other hand, Southeast Asian economies of Thailand, Malaysia and
Singapore are characterized by much greater labour mobility. Both Eichengreen and
Bayoumi (1999) and Goto and Hamada (1994) note that labour markets are more
ﬂexible in Asia than they were in Europe in early 1990s.
3 The Euro Experience
The case for OCA received a strong ﬁllip with the adoption of a common currency by 11
member countries of the European Union on January 1, 1999. However, the evolution
of a common currency did not happen overnight and was a result of coordinated
monetary policies over a period of more than 25 years. After the collapse of the
Bretton Woods system in 1973, European countries allowed their currencies to ﬂoat
against the dollar but tried to narrow the degree of ﬂuctuation vis-´ a-vis each other.
The ﬁrst signiﬁcant institutional step towards monetary uniﬁcation was the for-
mation of the European Monetary System (EMS). France, Germany, Italy, Belgium,
Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg and Netherlands began operating a system of mutu-
ally pegged exchange rates in March 1979. Even though inﬂation levels varied widely
across these countries, the ﬁxed-rate area in Europe succeeded through a mixture of
policy cooperation and realignment.
The European Currency Unit (ECU) was an artiﬁcial “basket” currency that was
used by these countries as their internal accounting unit. To protect the members from
currency crisis as well as to provide greater latitude to conduct independent monetary
policies, the EMS’s operations were aided by several safety valves. The EMS deﬁned
bands in which the bilateral exchange rates of the countries could ﬂuctuate and the
bands of ﬂuctuation were characterized by a set of adjustable bilateral central parities
and margins that deﬁned the bandwidth of permissible ﬂuctuations. Thus the “ﬁxed”
exchange rates could ﬂuctuate up or down by as much as 2.25% relative to an assigned
par value, although several members were successful in negotiating bands of 6%.
The EMS also developed generous provisions of credit from strong to weak currency
members. If the French franc depreciated too far against the Deutsche Mark, the
Bundesbank was expected to lend the Bank of France Marks that could be sold for
Francs in the foreign exchange market. Moreover, during the initial years of the
4EMS, several countries like France and Italy maintained capital controls to reduce the
possibility of a speculative attack.
Despite these safeguards, the EMS went through periodic currency realignments.
There were 11 realignments between the start of EMS in 1979 and January 1987.
Capital controls played an important role in shielding members’ reserves from specu-
lators during these adjustments. However, from 1987 there were concerted eﬀorts to
remove capital controls to achieve the objective of free movement of capital within
the European Union (EU), which was a key element of the plan to turn Europe into
a single uniﬁed market.
For a period of ﬁve and half years since January 1987, no adverse economic event
shook the EMS’s commitment to ﬁxed exchange rates. In this period, the ﬁxed ex-
change rate club grew adding Spain to it’s ranks in 1989, Britain in 1990, and Portugal
in early 1992. However, this arrangement faced a major shock after the German reuni-
ﬁcation. Large budget deﬁcits, triggered by transfers in people and ﬁrms in Eastern
Germany, together with an investment boom, accelerated demand in Germany. The
inﬂation averse Bundesbank reacted by sharply increasing interest rates. However,
other EMS countries such as United Kingdom, France and Italy were not witnessing a
boom. With the removal of capital controls, if these countries were to maintain their
peg with the German Deutsche Mark, they would have to raise their interest rates
also, which would have pushed their economies into deep recession. This policy con-
ﬂict between Germany and other EMS members led to a series of speculative attacks
on the EMS exchange parities in September 1992. By August 1993, the EMS was
forced to retreat to very wide (±15 %) bands.
Due to the frequent realignments within the EMS, a committee headed by Jacques
Dolores, president of the European Commission, recommended a three stage transition
to an economic and monetary union (EMU), an European Union in which national
currencies would be replaced by a single currency, managed by a sole central bank.
It was believed that a single currency would produce greater degree of integration
by removing the threat of currency realignments and eliminating costs to traders of
converting one EMS currency to another. Secondly, German management of the EMS
monetary policy had placed a one sided emphasis on German macroeconomic goals at
the expense of it’s partners’ interests. The European Central Bank (ECB) that would
replace the Bundesbank would be more considerate towards other countries’ concerns.
Finally, given the free movement of capital, there was little to gain and much to lose,
by keeping national currencies ﬁxed (but adjustable) parities rather than irrevocably
locking parities through a single currency.
5Table 1: Composition of the European Currency Unit
13/03/79 to 16/09/84 17/09/84 to 21/09/89 21/09/89 to 31/12/99
ISO Currency Value Weight (%) Value Weight (%) Value Weight (%)
BEF Belgian Francs 3.80 9.64 3.85 8.57 3.301 8.183
DEM German Marks 0.828 32.98 0.719 32.08 0.6242 31.915
DKK Danish Krones 0.217 3.06 0.219 2.69 0.1976 2.653
FRF French Francs 1.15 19.83 1.31 19.06 1.332 20.306
GBP British Pounds 0.0885 13.34 0.0878 14.98 0.08784 12.452
IEP Irish Punts 0.00759 1.15 0.00871 1.20 0.008552 1.086
ITL Italian Lira 109 9.49 140 9.98 151.8 7.840
LUF Luxembourg Francs (*) (*) (*) (*) 0.13 0.322
NLG Dutch Guilders 0.286 10.51 0.256 10.13 0.2198 9.87
GRD Greek Drachmas 1.15 1.31 1.44 0.437
ESP Spanish Peseta 6.885 4.138
PTE Portugese Escudos 1.393 0.695
Technical Notes: The Belgian and Luxembourg francs were in a currency union. Thus, the ECU basket values
are combined and shown only for Belgium. Weights are evaluated at central parities on March 13, 1979 and
September 17, 1984.
From May 3, 1998 through December 31, 1998, the rates of the 9 currencies that are part of the ECU basket as
well as euro-11 member currencies were irrevocably ﬁxed. Weights are evaluated at the prevailing exchange rates
on December 31, 1998.
On Dec 10, 1991, the leaders of EU met at Maastricht and proposed national rati-
ﬁcation of several amendments to the existing Treaty of Rome (1957). The Mastricht
Treaty had a provision that called for introduction of a single European currency and
central bank no later than January 1, 1999. By 1993, all 12 countries then belonging
to the EU had ratiﬁed the Mastricht Treaty. Austria, Finland and Sweden accepted
the treaty’s provisions upon joining in 1995.
The Mastricht Treaty speciﬁed that countries had to satisfy several macroeco-
nomic convergence criteria before they could be admitted to EMU. These included
pre-set targets on inﬂation, exchange rate variability, ﬁscal deﬁcit and public debt.
In addition, a supplementary Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) tightened the ﬁscal
straitjacket even more. The reason for excessive controls on ﬁscal deﬁcit and public
debt was to ensure an environment of low inﬂation and ﬁscal restraint. Otherwise
the Euro would be a weak currency and fall prey to the type of policies that fueled
previous European inﬂations.
By May 1998, 11 EU countries had satisﬁed the convergence criteria and became
the founder members of the EMU. These were Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Britain and
Denmark exercised their privilege to stay outside the monetary union and Sweden
failed to satisfy the criteria on exchange rate as it was never a member of the EMS.
64 The Rupee and the ACU
While initiating steps towards the creation of an ACU is indeed commendable, a
perplexing feature has been the exclusion of Indian Rupee till now, in the formation
of the ACU. An endevour to enhance regional cooperation in Asia must take into
account the ground realities. India is currently the largest economy of South Asia and
has been growing at an average annual rate of 8.5% during the past four years.
Table 2: Share of Asian Economies in GDP, Merchandise Trade and International
Debt Securities (2006)
GDP Merchandise Trade International Debt Securities
Exchange Rate PPP Population Import Export Residence Nationality
Brunei 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.22 0.08 0.00 0.00
Cambodia 0.07 0.20 0.44 0.12 0.15 0.00 0.00
Indonesia 3.51 4.19 7.09 2.90 2.86 1.71 2.65
Laos 0.03 0.06 0.18 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00
Malaysia 1.45 1.36 0.83 4.60 4.18 5.58 4.63
Myanmar 0.13 0.52 1.49 0.12 0.07 0.00 0.00
Philippines 1.13 2.02 2.72 1.33 1.57 6.80 4.64
Singapore 1.27 0.62 0.14 8.36 8.13 10.16 6.48
Thailand 1.99 2.62 1.92 3.93 4.37 2.42 1.76
Vietnam 0.59 1.21 2.68 1.12 1.36 0.37 0.00
ASEAN 10.27 12.85 17.50 22.74 22.83 27.04 20.16
Japan 42.06 18.64 3.91 19.53 19.57 32.46 45.68
China 25.33 41.65 40.39 26.83 24.22 3.34 4.23
Korea 8.55 5.05 1.48 9.56 10.29 19.16 14.53
ASEAN+3 86.21 78.19 63.28 78.67 76.91 82.00 84.60
India 8.54 17.62 35.80 4.90 6.63 3.46 2.85
ASEAN+3+1 94.75 95.81 99.08 83.57 83.54 85.45 87.44
Hong Kong 1.83 1.14 0.22 10.01 10.07 10.51 9.33
Taiwan 3.43 3.05 0.70 6.42 6.40 4.04 3.23
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Data on GDP, import and export has been obtained from the International Monetary Fund while data
on population is from UN Statistics. International debt securities data is extracted from Bank of International
Settlements.
Table 2 looks at the share of the various Asian economies across some major
economic indicators. Apart from the ASEAN+3 members it also includes India, Hong
Kong and Taiwan. It can be clearly seen that India plays a far more dominating role
in the region compared to most of the ASEAN countries. In terms of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), India accounts for 8.54% of the regional GDP whereas the entire
ASEAN region accounts for slightly more than 10%. Once we consider the diﬀerences
in cost of living across the countries, India’s share in the regional GDP climbs to
over 17%, nearly 1.5 times that of the entire ASEAN region. India is also home to
7more than 35% of the region’s population, which is nearly twice that of the combined
countries of the ASEAN region. Moreover, in terms of FDI inﬂows, India received
close to $17 billion in 2006 and was the fourth largest recipient in this region.
In the last decade and a half, India has undertaken several reforms in the external
sector and as a result, it’s import and export shares in 2006 stood at 4.90% and 6.63%
of the region. India has also emerged as one of the top FDI recipients in the region.
Finally, looking at the international debt securities issued country-wise we ﬁnd that
barring Singapore, Malaysia and Philippines, other ASEAN countries have a lower
share than India.
Thus it is clear that India occupies an extremely important position in the region
and it’s opinions need to be taken into account while striving for a common currency
unit. The Indian economy, currently valued over $ 1 trillion, has experienced a robust
growth of over 8% during the last four years. The exchange rate regime, characterized
as a managed ﬂoat, allows the Indian Rupee far greater ﬂexibility than some of it’s
East Asian neighbours like China, Malaysia and Hong Kong.1 Moreover, in recent
years India has consciously sought greater integration with East Asian countries as a
part of it’s Look East Policy.2
Finally, the ACU is being largely thought as a precursor to a common currency
in the distant future, just like the European Currency Unit was the predecessor of
the Euro. Thus it is important not to focus only on the current state but have a
dynamic outlook about how the region will look 30-40 years from now. According to
several estimates India is currently poised to be the third largest economy in the world
and second largest in the region over the next 30 years.3 Hence inclusion of India in
an eﬀort towards greater economic monetary integration in the region seems to be a
prudent decision.
On it’s part, India needs to take certain steps to ensure greater trade and in-
vestment integration with the region. Currently, India’s merchandise trade with
ASEAN+3 economies constitute around 25% of the total trade and this needs to
be signiﬁcantly increased. Moreover, India must also seek greater participation in
other regional initiatives like the Chiang Mai Initiative and the Asian Bond Market
Initiative to ensure greater integration of it’s ﬁnancial sector with similar segments in
1While the Chinese Renminbi and Malaysian Ringitt were pegged to the US Dollar till July 2005,
the Hong Kong has a currency board arrangement with the US.
2India has already entered into bilateral trade agreements or is in the process of entering into
such agreements with several East Asian economies. These include Comprehensive Economic Coop-
eration Arrangement (CECA) with Singapore, Free Trade Agreement with Thailand and framework
arrangements with ASEAN, Indonesia and Malaysia.
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8the region.
5 Composition of the Asian Currency Unit
The primary reason for a move towards any common currency unit is to reduce the
volatility that is observed among bilateral exchange rates. Regional monetary and
ﬁnancial cooperation contributes a great deal to global and regional ﬁnancial stability.
Moreover, deepening monetary and exchange rate policy coordination would be es-
pecially beneﬁcial to the highly export-oriented and deeply interdependent economies
of Asia as it will facilitate trade by reducing the transaction costs. The ACU could
also facilitate development of an Asian multi-currency bond market and a deepening
of capital markets, which would help to reduce exposure to external shocks. In gen-
eral reduced currency volatility in the region will ensure that more of Asia’s saving
remains in the region and the savings are eﬃciently put to work by the regional ﬁnan-
cial system. As pointed out by Kuroda (2006) this will signiﬁcantly help in meeting
Asia’s massive need for infrastructure investment, which is currently unmet as excess
ﬁnancial savings are ﬁnding their way to the global capital markets.
The oﬃcial value of the common currency unit in terms of a num` eraire currency
depends on two things, the weights of the diﬀerent currencies in the basket and the
value of these currencies in terms of the num` eraire currency.












ACU,t is the value of the ACU in terms of currency i at time t,
ψj is the share of currency j in ACU, and
ξi
j,t is the value of currency j in terms of currency i at time t.
5.1 A Hypothetical ACU
For analytical simplicity, consider a hypothetical ACU, which includes the currencies
of the four largest countries of East and South Asia, i.e. China, Japan, Korea and
India. For simplicity we also assume that each country’s currency has a equal weight
in the ACU. Moreover, we use the Dollar as the num` eraire currency. Based on the
bilateral exchange rates between the four major currencies of Asia the value of ACU
9is given as:4
1ACU = 0.25CNY+0.25JPY+0.25KRW+0.255INR
= 0.25 ∗ 0.133USD + 0.25 ∗ 0.025USD + 0.25 ∗ 0.0088USD + 0.25 ∗ 0.0011USD
= 0.04189USD
Now suppose owing to some exogenous shock, the Chinese Renminbi appreciates
by 10% against the the dollar. Due to the arbitrage condition the Chinese Renminbi
will also appreciate against the other three Asian currencies. In such a situation the
revised value of the ACU is given as
1ACU = 0.25CNY+0.25JPY+0.25KRW+0.255INR
= 0.25 ∗ 0.146USD + 0.25 ∗ 0.025USD + 0.25 ∗ 0.0088USD + 0.25 ∗ 0.0011USD
= 0.04521USD
The above example shows that the variation in the exchange rates of the individual
currencies vis-´ a-vis the ACU is lower than the variation in the bilateral exchange rates.
In this example, the Chinese Renminbi appreciated against all other currencies by 10%.
However, against the ACU it appreciated by only 1.9%, while the ACU appreciated
against the USD by 7.9%. On the other hand while the Asian currencies depreciated
against the Chinese Renminbi by 10%, they depreciated against the ACU by 7.35%.
Any basket of currencies that are not perfectly correlated will exhibit diversiﬁcation
properties, i.e. the variability of the basket is less than the weighted sum of the
variability in components.
Any ACU position can be replicated by transacting in all the individual partici-
pating currencies. However, that would subject agents to an overwhelming number
of transactions. Moreover, these transactions would be taking place in thinly traded
markets and would be in fractional and odd amounts. These would severely increase
the transaction costs and render several investment projects unviable.
The ﬁnancial markets in many Asian countries are small and they lack several
ﬁnancial instruments and products available to the more developed countries in the
region. By undertaking transactions in a common unit, these lesser developed coun-
tries would be able to trade across a wider range of products at a more favourable
rates than they might in their domestic terms.
4Exchange rates as on September 17, 2007 implied that 1USD = 7.52CNY = 40.36INR =
114.92JPY = 928.65KRW
105.2 The Asian Big 4
In the hypothetical example considered in Section 5.1, we assigned equal weights to all
currencies. However, typically, the weights assigned to individual currencies represent
the economic importance or size of the countries. Economic size of a country can be
measured in several ways like share in nominal GDP, share in GDP measured using
purchasing power parity, share in intra-regional trade etc. In this section we calculate
the value of ACU looking at diﬀerent combinations of countries.
First we consider the case where only the currencies of the four largest countries
of Asia enter into the value of the ACU. These include, Japan, China, South Korea
and India. In terms of nominal GDP, these four countries account for 78% of Asia’s
GDP, while in terms of GDP based on purchasing power their share is over 74%.
Clearly these countries have a major role to play in promoting economic and monetary
integration in Asia.
The relative weight of each currency is determined by the economic size of the
country. We use the share of these countries’ GDP as well as their export share to
calculate the weights. We also need to choose a base year i.e. a year when major
macroeconomic indicators across various countries were relatively close to each other.
The rationale behind such a move is that with the introduction of the common cur-
rency unit, the bilateral exchange rates become relatively ﬁxed and there is a change
in the array of economic policy instruments available to stabilize the economy. Mem-
bers of a common currency unit need to follow a coherent set of domestic policies for
the common currency unit to work eﬀectively. The Maastricht convergence criteria
for joining the European Economic and Monetary Union was established to promote
coherent policymaking among the potential entrants. It involved convergence of in-
ﬂation rate, annual government deﬁcit, government debt, exchange rate stability and
long term interest rate over a period of time. Following this convention, we look at
the above macroeconomic indicators across the four countries. As a measure of exter-
nal balance we also focus on the ratio of current account to GDP. We ﬁnd that the
variation in most of the macroeconomic indicators is least in the year 2001 and hence
select that as the benchmark year.5 Moreover, this choice of the base year also ensures
that the estimation of the ACU is largely uninﬂuenced by the aftereﬀects of the 1997
Asian Crisis.
5Several other papers like Watanabe and Ogura (2006) and Ogawa and Shimizu (2005, 2006) have
also referred to 2001 as the base years as the Asian economies showed least divergence among across
major macroeconomic indicators like current account balance, ﬁscal deﬁcit, inﬂation rates and public
debt.
11Table 3: Composition of ACU involving Asian Big 4
Dollar as the Num` eraire Currency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
National Currency GDP Nominal GDP PPP Exports
per $ (2001) Weights (%) Units Weights (%) Units Weights (%) Units
China 8.28 20.77 1.72 44.92 3.72 30.82 2.55
India 47.19 7.43 3.51 21.12 9.97 5.05 2.38
Japan 121.53 64.25 78.08 27.36 33.25 46.72 56.78
Korea 1290 7.56 97.47 6.60 85.19 17.42 224.69
Euro as the Num` eraire Currency
National Currency GDP Nominal GDP PPP Exports
per €(2001) Weights (%) Units Weights (%) Units Weights (%) Units
China 7.41 20.77 1.54 44.92 3.33 30.82 2.28
India 42.25 7.43 3.14 21.12 8.92 5.05 2.13
Japan 108.77 64.25 69.88 27.36 29.76 46.72 50.81
Korea 1154.36 7.56 87.23 6.60 76.23 17.42 201.07
Finally, we need to choose an external currency against whom the value of the ACU
will be measured. We consider the US Dollar as well as the Euro, given the growing
importance of European Union as Asia’s trading partner. The weights of the various
currencies in the ACU should reﬂect their economic size. Consequently, we base the
weights on GDP, in terms of nominal exchange rate as well as purchasing power parity
and exports. Data on nominal and purchasing power based GDP is obtained from the
World Economic Outlook, while data on exports and bilateral exchange rates is taken
from the International Financial Statistics.
Column (1) of Table 3 lists the bilateral exchange rates of the Asian currencies
vis-´ a-vis the US Dollar and Euro in the base year. In the base year, one unit of ACU
is assumed to be equal to one unit of the num` eraire currency, say the US Dollar.
In 2001 Japan accounted for 64.25% of total area’s nominal GDP and is followed by
China, which contributed 20.77%. India and Korea accounted for 7.43 and 7.56%
respectively. Given that the weights correspond to the economic size of the partici-
pating countries, it implies that one unit of the ACU will include $0.6425 equivalent of
Japanese Yen, $0.2077 equivalent of Chinese Renminbi, $0.0756 equivalent of Korean
Won and $0.0743 of Indian Rupee. Given the bilateral exchange rates between the
Asian currencies and US Dollar in 2001, it implies the ACU will include 1.72 units
of Chinese Renminbi, 3.51 units of Indian Rupees, 78.08 units of Japanese Yen and
97.47 units of Korean Won. The relative weights and corresponding amount of individ-
ual Asian currencies will expectedly change when we use GDP in terms of Purchasing
12Power Parity as a measure of economic size. China has the highest weight with 44.92%
followed by Japan at 27.36%, India at 21.12% and Korea at 6.60%. Finally, when we
focus on exports as a measure of economic size, we ﬁnd that Japan has the highest
weight followed by China, Korea and India. The lower panel of Table 3 looks at the
scenario where Euro is considered the num` eraire currency.
Figure 1 outlines the movement of the ACU vis-´ a-vis the US Dollar and the Euro
using diﬀerent measures of weights. Apart from the three measures listed in Table
3, we also use weights that are calculated using the average of nominal GDP and
exports as well as GDP using PPP measure and exports. Across the various measures
of economic size, the ACU weakened by 1% to 2% between 2001 and 2002. However,
since then the ACU has been steadily appreciating against the US Dollar and by
middle of 2007, the ACU gained about 6 to 10% compared to the base year.
The other interesting feature is the fact that the value of the ACU vis-´ a-vis the US
Dollar exhibited maximum volatility when economic size is measured using nominal
GDP and least volatility when weights based on GDP using PPP measure is used.
On the basis of nominal GDP, Japan is accorded the highest weight, and the Yen
appreciated sharply against the US dollar between Feb 2002 and Dec 2004. Thereafter,
the US Dollar regained some value against the Japanese Yen. On the other hand, when
economic size is measured using PPP based GDP, China is given the maximum weight,
and the Chinese Renminbi was pegged to the dollar throughout the period till July
2005.
On the other hand, between 2001 and 2007, the Euro has become relatively stronger
against the ACU as the latter lost about 30% of it’s value against the former. When
we use Euro as the num` eraire currency, the value of ACU shows relatively similar
volatility across the various measures of weights used. Compared to 2001, the Chinese
Renminbi depreciated by 38.4% against the Euro while Indian Rupee and Japanese
Yen depreciated by 33.7% and 44.6% respectively. In contrast, the Korean Won de-
preciated by only 7.5%. As a result, the value of ACU using weights based on export
shares, where Korea has a signiﬁcant presence, shows least volatility.
To calculate the exchange rate of national currencies of Asian Big 4 vis-´ a-vis the
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(b) Trend vis-´ a-vis the Euro










i,0 is the value of the Asian currency in terms of ACU in the base year, i.e.
2001. The deviation indicator takes a value of 0% in the base year by construction.
Figure 2 shows percentage deviation in the value of the Asian currencies vis-´ a-vis the
ACU, using US dollar as the num` eraire currency. Across the various measures of
weight we ﬁnd that the Korean Won has shown the maximum volatility, where as the
Indian Rupee is the most stable currency.
There is also evidence of strong misalignment among the four currencies. The
Korean Won experienced over 25% deviation from the benchmark rate in 2007. It
experienced a strong overvaluing deviation of nearly 20% between 2004 and 2006,
primarily because the Won was appreciating steadily against the Dollar. The Japanese
Yen showed a small negative deviation from the base rate in 2002. However, thereafter
it became stronger vis-´ a-vis the ACU till 2004 as the Yen became stronger against the
Dollar. From 2004, the Japanese Yen started becoming weaker against the ACU and
by 2007 it exhibited about negative 7% deviation.
The Indian Rupee has been relatively stable against the ACU and it has ﬂuctuated
between a band of ±5% during the entire period. Finally, the Chinese Renminbi
became weaker vis-´ a-vis the ACU from 2002 to 2004. During this period the Chinese
Renminbi was strictly pegged to the Dollar and as the Dollar became weaker against
the other Asian currencies so did the Renminbi. However, in August 2005, People’s
Bank of China (PBOC) announced a revaluation of the currency and a reform of the
exchange rate regime. Under the reform, the PBOC incorporated a “reference basket”
of currencies when choosing it’s target for the Renminbi. Since then the Renminbi
has become relatively stronger against the ACU and in 2007 it stood within a narrow
±2% band vis-´ a-vis the ACU.
Figure A.1 in Appendix calculates the percentage deviation in the value of the
Asian currencies vis-´ a-vis the ACU using Euro as the num` eraire currency. The results
diﬀer substantially from when US Dollar was considered as the num` eraire currency.
The Korean Won continues to be the most volatile currency and appreciated by 15%
in 2007 compared to the benchmark value. On the other hand, the Chinese Renminbi,
Japanese Yen and Indian Rupee became weaker relative to the benchmark value. From
2001 to 2004, the Chinese Renminbi, by the virtue of being pegged to the US Dollar,
became weaker by 15%. However, since then it has recovered some of it’s value and in
15Figure 2: Change in the Value of Participating Currencies vis-´ a-vis ACU: Asian Big






















































































































































































(e) Exports and GDP Based on PPP Measure
162007 was about 8% weaker compared to the benchmark value. In 2007, the Japanese
Yen and the Indian Rupee were weaker by around 15% and 8% respectively, relative
to the benchmark value.
Thus the percentage deviation indicators are extremely sensitive to the choice of
the num` eraire currency. In 2007, both the Chinese Renminbi and the Indian Rupee
were stronger relative to their benchmark value when the ACU is calculated using the
US Dollar as the num` eraire currency. However, when Euro is used as the num` eraire
currency, both these participating currencies found themselves weaker relative to the
benchmark value.
5.3 Inclusion of Extra Regional Currencies in Asian Currency Unit
Next, we extend the analysis by evaluating the composition of the ACU involving
the Asian Big 4 countries along with the ASEAN member states and economies of
Australia and New Zealand. These 16 countries are a part of the East Asia Summit
(EAS) where issues of common political, economic and strategic interest are being
discussed.
One of the key issues being debated at the East Asia Summit involve the strength-
ening of the Asian monetary and ﬁnancial architecture involving the EAS countries
through the creation of an Asian Currency Unit and using it to facilitate intra-regional
trade and exchange rate stability. In this section, we calculate an ACU made up of
currencies of countries involved in the EAS and focus on the percentage deviation of
the participating currencies from this ACU.
It is clearly evident that the inclusion of the additional countries has a relatively
small impact on the GDP based weights of the Asian Big 4. The latter continue to
corner a signiﬁcant part of the regional GDP. In terms of nominal GDP, the Asian
Big 4 countries account for nearly 87% of the nominal GDP while in terms of GDP
based on PPP their share is over 83%. Only in the case of export based weights, there
is a signiﬁcant decline in the share of the Asian Big 4 with several of the ASEAN
10 economies like Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia, as well as Australia and New
Zealand being signiﬁcant exporters of the region.
Evaluating the movement of the ACU based on 16 participating currencies, in Fig-
ure 3, reveals that while the trend is broadly similar to Figure 1, there are some im-
portant quantitative diﬀerences. The ACU again experienced an appreciation against
the US Dollar but the quantum of appreciation is signiﬁcantly higher than the previ-
ous section. This was primarily due to the inclusion of Thai Baht, Singapore Dollar,
Australian Dollar and New Zealand Dollar, all of which experienced signiﬁcant appre-
17ciation vis-´ a-vis the US Dollar. Moreover, since most of the above mentioned countries
are major exporters of the region, the ACU witnessed maximum appreciation when
export based weights are used.
Table 4: Composition of ACU involving Extra Regional Currencies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dollar as the Num` eraire Currency
National Currency GDP Nominal GDP PPP Exports
per $ (2001) Weights (%) Units Weights (%) Units Weights (%) Units
Brunei Dar. 1.790 0.076 0.001 0.051 0.001 0.264 0.473
Cambodia 3916.330 0.054 2.110 0.176 6.911 0.129 505.051
China 8.280 17.977 1.489 37.151 3.076 19.117 158.289
India 47.190 6.430 3.034 17.471 8.244 3.846 181.513
Indonesia 10260.900 2.180 223.692 4.477 459.370 4.010 41148.620
Japan 121.530 55.608 67.580 22.627 27.498 30.186 3668.485
Korea 1290.990 6.540 84.434 5.462 70.516 11.415 14737.140
Lao PDR 8954.580 0.024 2.141 0.061 5.428 0.029 262.217
Malaysia 3.800 1.194 0.045 1.424 0.054 6.543 24.863
Myanmar 6.680 0.088 0.006 0.415 0.028 0.177 1.182
Philippines 50.990 0.966 0.493 2.148 1.095 2.285 116.504
Singapore 1.790 1.160 0.021 0.653 0.012 9.534 17.066
Thailand 44.430 1.568 0.697 2.726 1.211 4.981 221.291
Vietnam 14725.200 0.441 64.948 1.169 172.154 1.141 16795.063
Australia 1.936 4.996 0.097 3.451 0.067 5.184 0.100
New Zealand 2.379 0.698 0.017 0.538 0.013 1.159 0.028
Euro as the Num` eraire Currency
National Currency GDP Nominal GDP PPP Exports
per €(2001) Weights (%) Units Weights (%) Units Weights (%) Units
Brunei Dar. 1.594 0.076 0.001 0.051 0.001 0.264 0.421
Cambodia 3388.657 0.054 1.826 0.176 5.980 0.129 437.002
China 7.414 17.977 1.333 37.151 2.755 19.117 141.741
India 42.219 6.430 2.715 17.471 7.376 3.846 162.392
Indonesia 9214.138 2.180 200.872 4.477 412.507 4.010 36950.857
Japan 108.921 55.608 60.568 22.627 24.645 30.186 3287.859
Korea 1157.713 6.540 75.717 5.462 63.236 11.415 13215.735
Lao PDR 6830.971 0.024 1.633 0.061 4.141 0.029 200.031
Malaysia 3.408 1.194 0.041 1.424 0.049 6.543 22.298
Myanmar 5.976 0.088 0.005 0.415 0.025 0.177 1.058
Philippines 45.860 0.966 0.443 2.148 0.985 2.285 104.783
Singapore 1.606 1.160 0.019 0.653 0.010 9.534 15.314
Thailand 39.913 1.568 0.626 2.726 1.088 4.981 198.792
Vietnam 13475.670 0.441 59.436 1.169 157.545 1.141 15369.891
Australia 1.733 4.996 0.087 3.451 0.060 5.184 0.090
New Zealand 2.130 0.698 0.015 0.538 0.011 1.159 0.025
On the other hand, the ACU calculated using GDP-PPP weights experienced the
least appreciation through most of the period. Again, this was largely due to the strict
peg between Chinese Renminbi and the US Dollar. Only during the ﬁrst 6 months
of 2007 that the value of ACU based on GDP-PPP weights is higher than the ACU
based on nominal GDP weights. During this period, Japanese Yen, which carries the
highest weight in terms of nominal GDP became weaker relative to the US Dollar
and the Chinese Renminbi, which carries the highest weight in terms of GDP-PPP,
appreciated against the US Dollar.
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(b) Trend vis-´ a-vis the Euro
19If Euro is taken as the num` eraire currency, the results are again similar to that
of Asian Big 4. The ACU lost about 30% of it’s value against the Euro during the
period. There is less divergence among the various values of ACU, calculated using
diﬀerent measures of weight, compared to the trend vis-´ a-vis the US Dollar.
Figure 4 shows that the participating currencies have exhibited very diverse trends
vis-´ a-vis the ACU over the last seven years. The Lao Kip has shown the maximum
negative percentage deviation during this period. Compared to the base year, the
Lao Kip depreciated by more than 22% in 2005 against the ACU but since then it
has become stronger by 5%. The Vietnamese Dong and the Cambodian Riel also
steadily lost their value and by 2007 were weaker by 18 and 13% respectively, in 2007
relative to their base year value. As pointed out in Kawai (2007) these countries have
primarily followed an intermediate exchange rate system like a managed ﬂoat during
this period. On the other hand, Brunei Darussalam has a currency board arrangement
with Singapore and as a result the Singapore Dollar and Brunei Dollar showed exactly
the same percentage deviation against the ACU. Both these currencies became weaker
relative to the ACU from 2002 to 2005, but have experienced signiﬁcant strengthening
during the last couple of years, and in 2007 were 6% stronger than the benchmark
rate.
Among the major economies in the ASEAN region, Indonesian Rupiah had the
largest overvaluing deviation between 2001 and 2003 when it was stronger against the
ACU by nearly 14% compared to the base year value. However, since then it’s value
steadily declined compared to the ACU till 2005 when it was 5% weaker than the base
year value. In recent years the Indonesian Rupiah has again exhibited a resurgence
and by 2007 had gained more than 3% from it’s base year value. In contrast, the
Phillipine Peso became weaker by nearly 18% in 2004 from it’s benchmark value but
recovered smartly in the last couple of years, and in 2007 was weaker by only 3% from
the base value.
The Korean Won steadily appreciated against the ACU with most of the appre-
ciation coming in the last two years. By the middle of 2007, the Korean Won was
26% stronger vis-´ a-vis the ACU. The Thai Baht has also gained considerably against
the ACU. Most of this gain has come since 2005 when the Thai Baht gained more
than 17% vis-´ a-vis the US Dollar. Both Malaysian Ringitt and the Chinese Renminbi
show exactly the same extent of percentage deviation from 2001 till 2004 since both
currencies were pegged to the US Dollar during this period and they become weaker
by nearly 9% against the ACU. Malaysia announced the end of the peg to the U.S.
dollar immediately after China’s announcement of the end of the Renminbi peg to the
U.S. dollar on July 21, 2005. Since then the Chinese Renminbi and Malaysian Ringitt
have shown slightly diverse movement. At the end of the ﬁrst six months of 2007, the
20Figure 4: Change in the Value of Participating Currencies vis-´ a-vis ACU: Extra Re-
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(e) Exports and GDP Based on PPP Measure
22Chinese Renminbi was weaker by 2% from it’s base year value, whereas the Chinese
Renminbi was almost at par with it’s base year value.
The Japanese Yen has been relatively stable vis-´ a-vis the ACU from 2001 to 2004
and ﬂuctuated between a narrow range of ±2%. However, since then the Japanese
Yen started depereciating vis-´ a-vis the ACU and by 2007 had lost nearly 8% against
the ACU. The Indian Rupee has been one of the most stable currency of the region
and exhibited the least amount of volatility relative to the ACU. Relative to the base
year value, it’s value in any year has remained within a range of ±6%.
Figure A.2 illustrates the deviation of participating currencies when the ACU is cal-
culated using the Euro as the num` eraire currency. We again ﬁnd that though broadly
the results are qualitatively similar to the earlier case, there are signiﬁcant quantita-
tive diﬀerences. The Lao Kip steadily weakened against ACU and by 2007 was weaker
by more than 28% compared to the base year. During this period Vietnamese Dong,
Cambodian Riel and Myanmar Kyat also became weak vis-´ a-vis the ACU by more
than 14%, 8% and 6% respectively. Owing to the currency board arrangement between
the Brunei and Singapore Dollar, both these currencies exhibit similar movement vis-
´ a-vis the ACU. Both currencies experienced signiﬁcant depreciation between 2002 and
2004. However, since then both these currencies have strengthened considerably, and
by 2007 gained more than 10% compared to the base year.
Both the Korean Won and Thai Baht witnessed signiﬁcant appreciation vis-´ a-vis
the ACU. While the Korean Won gained more than 28%, the Thai Baht became
stronger by 24%. The Indonesian Rupiah appreciated by 15% between 2001 and 2003
but thereafter it considerably depreciated such that by 2005 the value of the Indonesian
Rupiah relative to the ACU was lower by 3% compared to the base year. In recent years
the Rupiah has experienced some appreciation. Between 2002 and 2004, Malaysian
Ringitt and Philippine Peso became weaker by 8% and 16% respectively. Both these
currencies appreciated in recent years, and by 2007 while Malaysian Ringitt was nearly
3% stronger compared to the base year, Philippine Peso was a par with it’s base year
value.
Both Japanese Yen and Indian Rupee remained relatively stable against the ACU,
and ﬂuctuated within a band of ± 5% throughout this period. On the other hand, the
Chinese Renminbi, by virtue of being pegged to the dollar, became weaker vis-´ a-vis
the ACU by 8%. However, after abandoning the peg in August 2005, the Renminbi
gained substantially and was at par with it’s benchmark value.
Thus it is clearly evident that regardless of the choice of the num` eraire currency in
the calculation of ACU there were severe misalignments among the Asian currencies
23during the past seven years. While the Korean Won and Thai Baht became stronger
by more than 20% from their base year value, Lao Kip and Vietnamese Dong became
weaker by a similar amount.
6 Towards a Common ACU
The creation of the Asian Currency Unit will play a signiﬁcant role in stabilizing
exchange rate volatility in the region and encourage monetary policy coordination.
Reduction of exchange rate volatility will substantially enhance intra-regional trade,
promote an Asian bond market and help investors in planning their future investment
decisions. However, to realize these beneﬁts, the participating countries will have to
make extra eﬀorts to promote the ACU as they will have to overcome the historical
inertia associated with the use of national currencies. Typically it is unattractive
for any particular agent to move towards ACU, abandoning the historical means of
exchange, unless suﬃcient number of agents have already done so. This ‘ﬁrst mover
disadvantage’ can act as a major hurdle in the creation of a critical mass of agents
using the ACU that is needed for the latter to be accepted as a standard means of
exchange.
All participating countries will have to think of strategies to promote the use and
acceptance of the ACU. At the outset it will be a good idea to distinguish between
a common currency and a parallel currency. Common currency implies that member
countries do not retain sovereignty over currency creation and monetary policy. The
Euro is a typical example. On the other hand, in the case of a parallel currency,
the member countries are in control of their currencies and monetary policy and in
addition participate in creating a joint currency that is allocated among members
according to some pre-determined rules. As pointed out by Eichengreen (2006) and
Mundell (2001), while Asia may not be ready for a common currency, the time is right
to work towards a parallel currency.
In this regard, while the European experience can be instructive in striving for
a common currency, the Asian economies will have to be careful in interpreting the
lessons, and adapt, rather than adopt, these lessons. When the European Monetary
System ﬁrst came into eﬀect in March 1979, very few people believed that within two
decades a single European currency would be a reality. At the time of inception the
European Currency Unit (ECU) had as little chance of becoming Europe’s currency
as the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) had of becoming the world’s currency.
A successful move towards an Asian Currency Unit has to overcome a number of
obstacles that are associated with greater economic and monetary integration. We
take a close look at some of these constraints.
246.1 Obstacles
6.1.1 CMI Framework: Weak Institution?
In any kind of a formal exchange rate arrangement within a region there is need for a
mechanism providing some degree of collective defence against speculative attacks on
a single currency. The recently developed Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) can provide
some institutional support against such speculative attacks. Following deliberations in
Chiang Mai in May 2000, Japan, China and South Korea signed bilateral agreements
with the original ﬁve ASEAN member countries establishing a network of bilateral
swap agreements (BSAs) aiming at greater monetary cooperation.6 The network en-
abled participating countries to draw from their respective BSAs for a period of 90
days. The ﬁrst drawing could be renewed seven times. The interest rate applicable to
the drawing is the LIBOR plus a premium of 150 basis points for the ﬁrst drawing and
the ﬁrst renewal. Thereafter, the premium increases by 50 basis points for every two
renewals, within an overall ceiling of 300 basis points. As can be seen in Figure 5, the
currency swaps amounted to over $83 billion in July 2007. To mitigate the problem
of moral hazard, these BSA swaps are linked with IMF disbursements. A country can
borrow only up to 20% if it is not under an IMF programme.
Apart from beneﬁts arising from nominal swaps, the BSAs signal political and
economic support in the event of a ﬁnancial distress. If the ACU is to become a
viable parallel currency, the Chiang Mai Initiative has to play a very important role.
Unfortunately, the current structure of the CMI has several shortcomings that can
reduce it’s eﬀectiveness. In it’s present form CMI is primarily bilateral in nature. The
use of BSAs requires approval from each lender. Under such circumstances, if a number
of members refuse to provide swaps or various swap providers demand diﬀerent terms
and conditions, the CMI looses it’s eﬀectiveness as a lender of last resort. Moreover,
discussion with various swap providers is time consuming and deprives swap requesting
countries of the ability to mount an eﬀective and prompt defence against speculative
attacks. Thus steps should be taken to multilateralize the existing bilateral swap
arrangements so that swap disbursements are made in a concerted and timely manner.
The BSA facility is only a small step towards ﬁnancial cooperation in the region.
The current size of the swap facility has only marginally increased the ﬁnancial re-
sources available to countries for helping them to meet their liquidity needs, and is
inadequate to prevent a ﬁnancial crisis of the kind witnessed in 1997. Moreover, only
20% of the BSA facility is immediately available to the borrowers while the remaining
80% requires IMF approval and hence is subject to IMF conditionalities. Such linkages
preserve the hegemony of the U.S. in the regional ﬁnancial framework, something that
the Asian countries are keen on breaking.






















































































26CMI’s current structure also ensures that participating countries do not feel an
urgent need to establish a central agency for conducting regional surveillance. The
absence of a central body to manage the resources and monitor the ﬁnancial develop-
ments in the region is a serious impediment to the evolution of a joint decision making
process.
Recognizing these shortcomings, the ASEAN+3 ministers agreed to take steps to
enhance the eﬀectiveness of the CMI. These include further integration and enhance-
ment of ASEAN+3 economic surveillance into the CMI framework, clear deﬁnition of
the swap activation process and the adoption of a collective decision-making mecha-
nism, increase in the size of swaps, and improvement of the drawdown mechanism.
6.1.2 Inadequate Surveillance in the Region
Eﬀective regional surveillance of national policies is a prerequisite for countries at-
tempting to adopt a singular currency or undertaking looser forms of monetary coop-
eration. One of the primary reasons for linking the BSA’s activation to the IMF is
due to the availability of a credible surveillance mechanism with the Fund for member
countries.
During the fallout of the Asian crisis, the need for some sort of an Asian surveillance
mechanism was recognized and it’s objective was to devise an early warning system
to prevent similar crises in the future as well as limit the impact of cross country
contagion during the fallout of the Asian crisis.
The ASEAN+3 countries have an existing system of surveillance process with
technical assistance from the Regional Economic Monitoring Unit (REMU) of the
ADB called the ASEAN+3 Economic Policy Review and Dialogue Process.7 The
process includes the preparation of a conﬁdential staﬀ report by the ADB, which
is reviewed by the policymakers of the member countries. The report is thereafter
discussed at a ﬁnance ministers’ meeting and is brought out as an agreed ministerial
statement.
The inherent structure of the entire review and surveillance process reveals several
glaring inadequacies. Firstly, since the staﬀ knows that the ﬁnal document is going to
be vetted by the various ministers, it is likely to be largely inoﬀensive in nature and
unlikely to underpin countries following policies that could be destabilizing for the
region. Such a document, as evident from the recent ministers’ statements, is unlikely
to encourage discussions about the incipient risks in the region.
7The REMU has been since renamed as Oﬃce of Regional Economic Integration (OREI)
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precise content of the information each government needs to provide. Consequently,
the information available to the various members is at the discretion of the reporting
country. This makes it very diﬃcult to draw comparisons among the various countries
and provide policy related conclusions.
This lack of independent and credible surveillance to monitor economic and ﬁ-
nancial developments in the region is a signiﬁcant obstacle to greater economic and
monetary integration. This is, of course, not to suggest that the Fund’s surveillance
mechanisms, essentially in the form of Article IV consultations, are decidedly supe-
rior. However, compared with the perceived lack of teeth in the ASEAN+3 surveillance
mechanism, there are probably important lessons to be learnt from the more upgraded
system of the Fund.
6.1.3 Underdeveloped Bond Market
A deep and well developed bond market facilitating orderly cross country ﬂows of
debt within the region is an important prerequisite for the ACU. To that extent the
initiative of setting up the Asian Bond Fund (ABF) was deﬁnitely a step in the right
direction as it enabled the bringing together of Asian economies with diﬀerent sizes
and economic structures. The eleven members of the Executives’ Meeting of East
Asia-Paciﬁc Central Bank (EMEAP) agreed in 2003 to establish the ABF, a regional
investment fund investing in bonds denominated in U.S. dollars.8 The initial corpus
was $1 billion with the various governments voluntarily contributing about 1% of their
reserves. The Fund was supposed to invest in bonds issued by the public sectors of
eight countries, the developed countries of Australia, New Zealand and Japan only
being lenders to the ABF.
With diﬀerent countries in the region exhibit varying degrees of current account
deﬁcits and surpluses, development of a strong bond market would have enabled use-
ful absorption of intra-regional debt ﬂows. However, the initial form of the ABF had
severe limitations that required to be resolved for ensuring greater ﬁnancial coopera-
tion. Firstly, the ABF could invest mainly in dollar denominated securities and was
unable to resolve an insolvency crisis of an Asian bond issuer in cases involving a
sharp declines in the values of the Asian currencies vis-´ a-vis the U.S. dollar like the
kind experienced by Thailand and Korea during the 1997 ﬁnancial crisis. Thus there
was a critical problem of ‘currency mismatch’. Secondly, majority of the bond issuers
belong to the private sector, and they tend to use the funds for long-term investments
8The EMEAP comprises of central banks of eleven economies: Reserve Bank of Australia, People’s
Bank of China, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Bank Indonesia, Bank of Japan, Bank of Korea,
Bank Negara Malaysia, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Monetary Au-
thority of Singapore, and Bank of Thailand
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or expectations worsen, foreign lenders are likely to reduce their risk exposure by
withdrawing funds, plunging local business into insolvency. Thus apart from currency
mismatch, the Asian Bond Fund also suﬀered from ‘maturity mismatch’. This ‘double
mismatch’ was one of the main reasons for the Asian ﬁnancial crisis in 1997.
Recognizing the threat of ‘currency mismatch’ and with the objective of promoting
local currency denominated bonds, the ABF-2 was introduced in December 2004. This
involved purchases of $2 billion of Asian-currency denominated sovereign and quasi-
sovereign bonds. ABF-2 also introduced a Pan-Asian Bond Index Fund (PAIF) and
a Fund of Bonds Fund (FBF). PAIF is a single bond fund index investing in local
currency bonds issued by eight countries. On the other hand, the FBF is made up
of two tiers. The parent fund is further divided into eight sub funds, each of which
invests in the local currency bonds issued in their respective markets.
Size again is a major weakness of this initiative. The current size of $2 billion
is insigniﬁcant compared to the reserve holdings or the infrastructural ﬁnancing re-
quirements of most of these countries. Second, the Fund covers only eight Asian
economies excluding some ASEAN members as well as other signiﬁcant economies
like India. Thus there is tremendous scope for improving both the coverage and the
size of the regional debt market. Moreover, owing to the limited supply of good quality
sovereign and quasi-sovereign bonds, initiatives like the ABF can actually crowd out
private bond purchases leading to no new net ﬁnancing.
6.1.4 Diverse Exchange Rate Regimes
The European experience, outlined in Section 3, indicates that the presence of a
common monetary regime, i.e. pursuit of region wide exchange rate stability, played
a key role in evolution of greater monetary cooperation. However, as can be seen
from Table 5, Asian countries follow a diverse range of exchange rate regimes. While
a number of the Asian currencies including Indian Rupee, Singapore Dollar, Thai
Baht, and Malaysian Ringitt can be classiﬁed as managed ﬂoats, other countries are
following diﬀerent exchange rate mechanisms. Brunei Dollar and Chinese Renminbi
continue to be pegged mainly to Singapore Dollar and U.S. Dollar respectively.9 On
the other hand, Japanese Yen, Korean Won, Indonesian Rupiah and Philippine Peso
9On July 21, 2005 China announced a 2.1% revaluation of the Renminbi-U.S. Dollar exchange
rate and a change in it’s exchange rate arrangement to allow the value of the Renminbi to ﬂuctuate
based on market supply and demand with reference to an undisclosed basket of currencies. From
end-July 2005 to end-July 2006, the Renminbi exchange rate was more ﬂexible, but the ﬂuctuation in
the Renminbi-U.S dollar exchange rate was less than the 2% range (for a three-month period) used
in the IMF’s de facto exchange rate classiﬁcation system as an indicator for a conventional ﬁxed peg
exchange rate arrangement.
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Table 5: Exchange Rate Arrangements in Asian Countries
Exchange Rate Arrangement Countries
Currency Board Brunei Darussalam
Other Conventional China and Vietnam
Fixed Peg Arrangements
Managed Floating with India, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Singapore
No Predetermined Path Cambodia, Myanmar and Thailand
Independently Floating Indonesia, Japan, Korea and Philippines
Source: IMF’s De facto Classiﬁcation of Exchange Rate Regimes and Monetary Framework
Such diverse exchange rate arrangements in the Asian region reﬂect the diﬀerent
objectives followed by the monetary policymaker. These range from ﬁxing the ex-
change rate with another country in a currency board system to import the latter’s
monetary policy, to keeping the exchange rate undervalued to promote export led
growth, and explicit inﬂation targeting. Reconciling such diverse objectives within
the region is bound to be a challenging task.
6.1.5 Economic, Historical and Political Heterogeneity
While arguing for greater economic integration in Asia, it is important to keep an eye
on the political, economic and historical diﬀerences between the countries in the region.
Asian countries diﬀer widely in terms of economic structure and level of development.
Divergence in per capita GDP between the former is much higher than that in Europe
or North America. In 2006, Japan and Singapore’s per capita GDP in PPP terms was
nearly 15 times that of Lao PDR. Similarly, share of exports in GDP range from below
15% in Japan to well over 100% in Malaysia and Singapore. Several countries like
China and the newer ASEAN members have extensively regulated ﬁnancial systems
and are unlikely to release operational control in the near future.
Moreover, while in Europe, Germany took the lead role in pushing towards mone-
tary integration, there is an absence of a clear leader in the Asian region. Japan is the
most developed country in the region but has unsettled historical issues with neigh-
bouring countries like China and Korea. Thus any bloc with Japan as the sole center
is unlikely to ﬁnd many takers in Asia. China, owing to it’s size and an impressive
growth over the last 25 years, can be another potential centre. However, it’s relatively
underdeveloped ﬁnancial architecture, inconvertible currency, and a central bank with
limited autonomy can be major impediments to any such claims. Moreover, China
also has it’s share of unresolved issues with Korea and India. Also it is likely to face
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it’s pursuit to emerge as the core of a regional currency arrangement.
The absence of a central country till now means that Asian cooperation needs to
rely more on a symmetric approach. Such cooperation requires a strong region wide
political commitment. The vast heterogeneity among countries, however, impedes the
fostering of political will. The Asian countries have wide diﬀerences in social struc-
tures, and economic systems, ranging from mature market economies like Japan and
Korea to economies in transition like China, India and Vietnam. Although, in recent
years countries have cooperated in areas of security and strategic interests, residual
Cold War attitudes might still constrain greater economic and monetary cooperation.
One of the key issues in this regard is the strategic relationships that many countries
in the region have with the US, which might create an ambiguity in pursuing Asian
regionalism. There exists doubts over whether regionalism would provide greater
beneﬁts than multilateralism in the region. Such arguments have inﬂuenced several
countries in Asia and discouraged the build up of the political consensus needed for
closer cooperation. The process has become more diﬃcult due to the wide divergence
in political systems and institutions in the region (eg. non-democratic governments in
China and Myanmar and mature democracies in India, Japan and Korea).
6.2 Strategies
A successful move towards an Asian Currency Unit needs to overcome the above ob-
stacles. Thus the move needs to be supported by two sets of factors. Firstly, certain
institutional safeguards have to be created or the existing ones strengthened, for pre-
venting the participating countries from breaking away from such an arrangement.
Secondly, strategies need to be devised for promoting the use and acceptability of this
parallel currency. We list below some of the safeguards and strategies that in our
opinion are key to the success of the ACU.
6.2.1 Periodic Review of the ACU
Given the extent of dynamism in most of the Asian economies, it is very important to
periodically review the composition of the ACU for ensuring that it reﬂects current
economic realities. The amount of each component currency will remain ﬁxed while
it’s contribution to the ACU will vary with the exchange rate. As currencies appreciate
(depreciate), there will be an increase (decrease) in their contribution to the ACU.
This will ensure that the ACU captures the relative changes in economic activity and
performance in the region in an eﬀective and dynamic manner.
316.2.2 Monetary and Exchange Rate Cooperation
A move towards an ACU would necessitate signiﬁcant monetary and exchange rate
cooperation among the participating countries. Given the diﬀerences in the exchange
rate policies and inﬂation rates among these countries, a system as tight as the ERM
will not be feasible. Several other alternative proposals have been mentioned, each of
which has it’s merits and demerits.
Williamson (1999) proposed that the Asian economies can adopt a common cur-
rency peg vis-´ a-vis the U.S. Dollar, Euro and Japanese Yen. This would stabilize
exchange rates both internally as well as vis-´ a-vis other major trading partners, Euro
Area and the U.S. Under this arrangement the member currencies have a common set
of weights based on the regional trade shares. The members announce a central parity
vis-´ a-vis the basket and pledge to keep the central parity within a unilaterally chosen
band. The central parity and the band is allowed to crawl in response to changes in
the fundamental. In response to massive speculative attacks countries are allowed to
temporarily suspend the peg with a credible pledge to return as soon as possible.
The biggest advantage of this arrangement is that it allows coexistence of the vari-
ous exchange rate regimes prevailing in the region like managed ﬂoat in India, Thailand
and Singapore, independent ﬂoat in Korea and the peg in China. Furthermore, while
there is less need for policy coordination and surveillance under this arrangement due
to a unilaterally chosen parity and band, the arrangement itself acts as a catalyst for
greater convergence and exchange rate stability, which is needed for a future move
towards a common currency as pointed out by Kawai and Takagi (2003). However, a
major problem in this arrangement is the adoption of common regional weights against
the target currencies. If some participating country’s trade share (weights) vis-´ a-vis
the target countries is very diﬀerent from the region as a whole then a change in the
bilateral exchange rates of the target currencies will have a skewed impact on these
countries and they will experience a loss of export competitiveness.
Another alternative arrangement suggested by Oh and Harvie (2001) analyzes the
potential of replicating the EMS’s Exchange Rate Mechanism in the Asian region,
with notable diﬀerences. Under this arrangement, an Asian Currency Unit similar to
the one developed in Section 5 will be put in place. The member countries’ exchange
rate will ﬂoat within a ± 15% band of the central parity determined by an author-
ity. Such an arrangement comes with several beneﬁts. It will signiﬁcantly reduce
interregional volatility of the nominal exchange rate as well as real eﬀective exchange
rate (REER) resulting from intraregional parity changes and a greater degree of co-
movement of the intraregional exchange rates. It will also induce faster economic and
monetary integration in the region. However, since the target is a basket of member
country currencies, realignments between major currencies outside the basket will not
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depreciates against the Euro but not the Japanese Yen then exports from countries
pegged to the U.S. Dollar will become more competitive in Euro land compared to
these Asian economies. Similarly, if the Japanese Yen appreciates by 10% against the
U.S. Dollar and Japan has 50% weight in the ACU, then other members of the ACU
will witness a 5% appreciation, which may reduce their competitiveness vis-´ a-vis other
dollar bloc countries.
Dornbusch and Park (1999) ﬂoated the idea of monetary cooperation among Asian
economies with the Japanese Yen as the anchor currency, a role performed by the
German Deutsche Mark under the ERM. However, given that the Japanese economy
has not been in very robust health in recent years it might be diﬃcult to push for
this proposal. Moreover such an arrangement will entail a loss of competitiveness of
Asian exports vis-´ a-vis other dollar blocs like MERCOSUR and NAFTA if Japanese
Yen appreciates against the U.S. Dollar.
6.2.3 A Centre Country
One of the commonly cited reasons for the successful monetary integration in Europe
is the central role played by Germany. It is widely believed that the presence of
a strong currency, Deutsche Mark, which acted as a nominal anchor in the EMS,
facilitated the integration. Moreover the Deutsche Mark was backed by the strong
Bundesbank - which focused on price stability and created an independent monetary
policy committee - features that have become trademarks of modern central banks.
While in hindsight the role played by Germany seems to be pivotal for European in-
tegration, at that time such a role was not planned and, when it existed, was studiously
underplayed. Formally, the EMS was a set of bilateral exchange rate arrangements
with no central currency. Economically strong and weak countries were subject to
identical obligations and interventionist rules. The emergence of the Deutsche Mark
as the nominal anchor took several years and was facilitated by irresponsible monetary
management by other large economies in the region, which led to speculative attacks
on their currencies and sapped their positions.
In the Asian context, while it is true that some form of country leadership is
desirable, such leadership should not be seen as intimidating and must be counter
balanced. In doing so, political and historical sensitivities, as well as current power
conﬁgurations must be kept in mind. While Japan continues be a major player in the
region, China and India have begun mounting serious challenges to Japan’s hegemony.
Hence a cohesive move towards greater Asian integration must take shape around these
few leading countries. The absence of a single centre of inﬂuence will ensure that the
leadership is balanced.
336.2.4 Strengthening the Chiang Mai Initiative and the Asian Bond Fund
At the ASEAN+3 Finance Minister’s meeting held in Istanbul during May 2005 it was
decided by the participating countries to make several changes in the existing CMI
structure. Apart from agreeing to integrate economic surveillance into the CMI to
develop an eﬀective regional surveillance, the member countries also agreed to adopt
a collective decision making mechanism as a ﬁrst step towards multilateralization.
It was also decided to expand the size of the bilateral agreements and increase the
amount a country can draw without having an IMF program.
While the amount that a country can draw without being subject to an IMF
program has been increased from 10% to 20%, not much progress has been made on
the other issues. The combined size of the network of BSAs has increased from $36.5
billion in April 2004 to $83 billion in July 2007 (Fig 5). Strong measures need to
be undertaken to further increase the size of this arrangement. One possible way is
to invite new members like India, which has almost $300 billion as reserves, into the
arrangement. Moreover, almost all the bilateral swaps are negotiated between China,
Japan, Korea and the original ASEAN countries. The smaller ASEAN members like
Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam are covered only by the ASEAN
Swap Agreement, which has a corpus of a measly $2 billion.
Similarly the Asian Bond Fund also needs to be increased from it’s current size and
coverage. Newer countries like India as well as other ASEAN economies can be invited
to join the fund. There is a serious need to amplify the corpus of funds available with
the ABF for it to play a deciding role in deepening capital market integration in the
region. Thus the central banks of the participating countries need to commit greater
resources to the Fund.
In it’s current form the ABF is managed by the Bank of International Settlements
(BIS) an association of global central banks. Thus the business of investing these
funds is primarily in the hands of central bankers who tend to be more conservative
and willing to sacriﬁce return for liquidity. To ensure greater development of interna-
tional capital markets in the region, participation of the private sector in the form of
investment bankers and institutional investors in the ABF needs to be encouraged.
6.2.5 Asian Monetary Cooperation Fund
Apart from strengthening the Chiang Mai Initiative and the Asian Bond Fund, the
Asian countries could create a regional fund denominated in the ACU. Such a fund
could be used to facilitate interventions in the currency markets, eﬀect liquidations
between the central banks and manage short-term credit facilities associated with
exchange rate cooperation. This fund could be created by tapping the enormous
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could contribute a certain percentage of their foreign reserves into the fund. Given
that the total reserve holdings of the economies considered in Section 5.3 is in excess
to $3 trillion, even if these countries contribute 10% of their reserve holdings, a fund
with over $300 billion will be created.
If the exchange rate of a participating currency falls too far, the Asian Mone-
tary Cooperation Fund (AMCF) could buy quantities of the currency on the foreign-
exchange market, and if it rises too far, AMCF could sell enough of the currency to
bring down the exchange rate. Alternatively, the AMCF could also issue a parallel
currency, Asian Currency Unit, which would be a weighted composition of member
countries’ currency. ACU denominated bonds can be encouraged and a regional clear-
ing and payment mechanism can be established for ACU transactions. Over time the
AMCF can be converted to Asian Central Bank and assume the role of conducting
monetary policy in East and South Asia.
The corpus available could be used to fund several developmental needs of the re-
gion. Primary among these uses could be ﬁnancing infrastructural investment. Many
countries of the region like India, Vietnam, Indonesia etc. are facing massive infras-
tructure deﬁcits, especially in physical infrastructures like highways, power, airports
etc. The AMCF could allocate funds, denominated in ACU, for such projects. This
would not only help mitigate the massive infrastructure deﬁcit in the region but also
promote the public and the private sector use of ACU. Other developmental needs that
could be funded by the AMCF include social infrastructure like health and education,
environmental protection and strengthening of the ﬁnancial sector, among others.
6.2.6 Implementing an Eﬀective Regional Surveillance System
One of the biggest challenges facing the ACU is the implementation of an eﬀective
regional surveillance mechanism. The existing ASEAN+3 surveillance mechanism
needs to be signiﬁcantly strengthened if it is to act as a meaningful instrument for
greater economic and monetary cooperation. According to Kenen and Meade (2008)
and Girardin (2004) the Asian economies need to move away from the principle of
‘non-intervention in other countries’ aﬀairs’ and actively provide their opinion on the
policies followed in member countries. While a confrontational approach involving di-
rect criticism of the neighbouring countries’ policies might not be feasible at this stage,
several other, less confrontational, measures can be undertaken. Kenen and Meade
(2008) and Grenville (2004) suggest a mechanism where the analysis and the recom-
mendations of an independent surveillance team is put before the member country and
the government is allowed to respond to the submissions. A healthy debate on major
macroeconomic and ﬁnancial sector issues impacting the reporting country is a must
for better surveillance and greater coordination. This underlines the need for greater
35constructive criticism among the member countries even if it comes at the expense of
occasionally overlooking the Asian tradition of not interfering in neighbours’ aﬀairs.
6.2.7 Greater Integration of Goods and Services Market
Monetary cooperation in Europe was achieved with the goal of turning Europe into a
truly uniﬁed market. The 1957 Treaty of Rome founding EU had established a cus-
toms union and barriers to goods and services trade were signiﬁcantly reduced over
the next four decades. Thus trade cooperation began long before ﬁnancial coopera-
tion. On the other hand, in East Asia ﬁnancial cooperation took lead mainly as a
response to the ﬁnancial crisis of 1997. Such ﬁnancial cooperation now needs to be
complemented with greater trade cooperation in the region. With the likelihood of
progress in implementing the Doha Development Agenda appearing highly limited,
countries in the region need to enhance trade cooperation through bilateral agree-
ments, rather than relying on multilateral trade talks. Figure 6 outlines the status
of various trade agreements in the region. It can be clearly seen that while some
countries like Japan have been vigorously pursuing bilateral trade agreements, other
countries like Philippines and Indonesia are lagging behind.
Figure 6: Status of Trade Agreements in Asia
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36Preferential or free trade agreements are likely to induce greater cooperation as
they are more ﬂexible, wider and relatively easily achievable . Greater market integra-
tion through PTA/FTAs will not only provide larger market access across the region
but will also impart eﬃciency through competition. In several cases trade agreements
can be used as a strategy for pushing domestic reforms. The foundation for Asian
economic agreement lies in increasing common economic interests based on economic
interdependence. The “ﬂying geese model” helped to build a vertical chain across the
region by encouraging capital mobility and technology transfer, thereby formulating a
high degree of intra-regional exchange. Such economic interdependence can be further
exploited through more free/preferential trade agreements among the region. With
greater intra-Asia trade integration, business cycles will be more correlated across
countries and it will be easier for the latter to engage in exchange rate cooperation,
which is crucial for moving towards an Asian Currency Unit.
6.3 Promoting the use of ACU
Currently, a substantial fraction of the Asian countries’ ﬁnancial and trade-related
transactions are invoiced and settled in dollars. The dollar continues to dominate the
Asian bond market and provides many advantages as a parallel Asian currency and
also has the advantage of incumbency. Thus the dollar acts as the de facto parallel
currency for the Asian region just like it did for the European countries in early
1970s. This is also one of the reason why the ECU never succeeded. However, current
circumstances are very diﬀerent from the 1970s and they necessitate a move away from
the U.S. dollar.
A contraction in output accompanied by weakening fundamentals of the U.S. econ-
omy points to further erosion in the value of the U.S. dollar vis-´ a-vis other major
currencies. Given that most of the assets of the Asian central banks are still denom-
inated in U.S. dollar, the value of these assets are likely to dip further. Thus it is
in the interest of the Asian central banks to move away to assets denominated in an
alternative currency, and the ACU could be one such alternative. Moreover, such a
move will have a positive impact on reduction of global imbalance as it will hasten
the depreciation of U.S. dollar vis-´ a-vis other currencies.
One of the reasons why countries hold reserves is to self insure themselves against
“sudden stops” of capital inﬂows and be able to ﬁnance imports in the case of a
signiﬁcant decline in their exports. To make it attractive for the Asian countries
to hold reserves in the form of ACU denominated assets, exports and imports of the
region, as well as ﬁnancial instruments, need to be invoiced in ACU. Thus the national
governments should create right incentives, which will induce traders to take and give
credit in ACU. These could range from ﬁscal concessions to regulatory waivers.
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in the ACU. This is of course contingent upon growth of a deeper and wider bond
market in the region. The existence of a regional ACU-denominated bond market is
likely to provide issuers with a greater availability of funds at a lower cost with deeper,
more liquid markets on which a larger diversity of instruments is traded. The success
of the ACU will depend on the participation of regional and extra-regional borrowers,
frequency and volume of the issues, and market liquidity. Given the current level of
integration in Asia, governments and the central banks of the participating countries
need to provide special support to ensure the success of ACU in the bond market.
The various multilateral agencies in the region like the ADB, ASEAN secretariat
etc. could also play a positive role in enhancing the use of the ACU. The ACU could
be used to establish the internal accounts of these multilateral organizations just like
the the internal accounts of the European Commission was established in ECU in
the early 1970s. Moreover, these multilateral agencies could issue bonds and loans
denominated in the ACU.
Following the multilateral agencies, the sovereign countries could also issue sovereign
bonds. This would particularly help the smaller countries of the ASEAN bloc to de-
velop active and liquid bond markets. In the other major Asian countries such bonds
would help fund the infrastructural needs of the government. The regional investors
will also have the beneﬁt from holding an internationally diversiﬁed asset portfolio
that is closely related with the regional conditions.
The development of a regional bond market needs to be supplemented by the
creation of a regional credit rating agency. This will help clear some of the information
asymmetry that international credit rating agencies suﬀer from, and as a result bond
issuers can be rated independent of their sovereign’s ratings. This will establish a way
for corporates and ﬁrms to borrow in this market as many of them have an investment
grade that does not allow them to raise capital in the global markets owing to the
information asymmetry.
A well functioning corporate bond market in Asia will be a major step in corporate
ﬁnancing and will help the move away from bank-intermediated ﬁnance, which has
been dominant in the region. The issue of ACU denominated bond by the Asian ﬁrms
and the holding of such bonds by Asian banks is an ideal way to move towards a
balanced and viable way of corporate ﬁnancing. Once the Asian banks start holding
ACU denominated bonds, it would be easier for them to start accepting deposits and
granting loans in ACU.
387 Conclusion
The primary objective of this paper was to study the feasibility of an Asian Currency
Unit in the region. The study concludes that there is an urgent need for the develop-
ment of a parallel currency in the region to ensure greater trade and ﬁnancial linkages.
This will also reduce the dependence of the Asian countries on dollar denominated
assets by extending a viable alternative to the central banks in the region who could
park their reserves in ACU denominated assets.
However, there are several obstacles in the path towards a successful ACU, which
range from political, economic and historical diﬀerences among the member countries
to the presence of relatively weak multilateral institutions in the region. The CMI has
provided only limited international support and is unlikely to facilitate the ACU. Lack
of eﬀective policy surveillance and an underdeveloped regional bond market are also
important roadblocks. Finally, diverse economic structures and institutions, coupled
with strong diﬀerences in political systems and several unresolved bilateral issues,
make the task of promoting the ACU a signiﬁcant challenge to the region. However,
most of these diﬃculties are surmountable provided that there is strong political will
in the region.
The current discussion on the feasibility of the ACU hardly features India. As we
have argued, this is a notable omission and overlooks the current economic realities
of the region. As of now, the proposed ASEAN+3 framework envisaged for the ACU
needs to be expanded by including India (as well as Australia and New Zealand). This
will ensure a larger and proper ﬁnancial integration of the region. The move will also
generate greater political and strategic support for the ACU given India’s escalating
strategic signiﬁcance in the region.References
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Figure A.1: Change in the Value of Participating Currencies vis-´ a-vis ACU: Asian Big
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42Figure A.2: Change in the Value of Participating Currencies vis-´ a-vis ACU: Extra
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